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PROMISSORY AND NON-PROMISSORY CONDITIONS
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS*
1. Definitions and Classifications
Internal conditions, or those which are terms of con-
tracts, may be classified in three different ways: (1) ex-
press, inferred, and constructive; (2) precedent, concurrent,
and subsequent; and (3) promissory and non-promissory (cas-
ual).
A non-promissory condition is a fact (act or event) other
than a promise which either suspends a duty of immediate
performance or another condition until it happens, or ex-
tinguishes such duty or other condition upon its happening.
A promissory condition is a promise whose performance either
suspends a duty of immediate performance until it occurs
or gives rise to such duty upon its occurrence. A, non-
promissory condition creates a privilege in the case of a
condition precedent and a power in the case of a condition
subsequent. A promissory condition creates both such a
privilege (or power) and also a right.
A representation differs from a condition in that it is
not a term in the contract but a fact which induces the mak-
ing of a contract, and when it has operative effect it does
not relate to the order of performances of the parties but
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. Credit for some assistance in
the preparation of the notes for this article is given to the following
students of the 1940 senior class in Indiana University School of
Law: Wilson G. Anderson, Jack Finney, Ruth E. Maier, Frank C.
Middleton, Isadore D. Rosenfeld, and Harold V. Whitelock.
(349)
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to the question of avoidance of the contract. The term war-
ranty is used in different senses. In insurance policies the
term warranty means that a representation is warranted
material, and thereby made a term in the contract and made
a non-promissory condition. In charter parties the warranty
is a promissory condition. In the law of sales at common law
a warranty was an independent collateral promise, but un-
der the Uniform Sales Act it is a promissory condition. In
conveyancing, a warranty is still treated as an independent
collateral promise rather than as a condition.
The three ways of classifying conditions are all import-
ant, but the classification of conditions as promissory and
non-promissory is, on the whole perhaps, the most important
and fundamental classification, a fact which the writer has
proven by his classroom experience. Yet in spite of this fact,
textbooks on contracts and other publications treating of the
law of contracts have almost without exception ignored this
classification,1 and the writer is, so far as he knows, the
only teacher of contracts who teaches the law of conditions
from this standpoint.
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the law
of contracts not only omits any discussion of this classifica-
tion except as it is incidentally found, as for example in sec-
tion 257, but has other sections which define "condition" and
"promise" so as to make them mutually exclusive. Thus, in
section 260 it is said that if in an agreement an act to be
performed purports to be the words of the person to do the
act, the words are interpreted as a promise unless a contrary
intention is manifested, but if the words are those of a party
who is not to do the act, the performance of the act is a
condition unless a contrary intention appears; and in section
261 it is said, "Where it is doubtful whether words create a
promise or an express condition they are interpreted as
creating a promise." Yet in spite of these sections, there
are other sections of the Restatement which recognize the
distinction between non-promissory and promissory condi-
tions and show that it is necessary to have such a classification
lAmong the exceptions may be named the Louisiana Code, which uses
the terms "casual" and "potestative," Rev. Civil Code La., §§2023-
2024, New Orleans v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 171 U. S. 812, 332(1897), and certain writers on Sales, CHALMRS SALE OF GOODS
ACT (2d) 165; BURDICK ON SALES, 84-87.
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in order properly to rationalize the law of conditions.2 The
chief criticism of the quoted sections of the Restatement is
that by excluding promises from conditions they ignore all
the law of constructive conditions created by Lord Mans-
field and this is the greater part of the law of conditions.
Lord Mansfield made one of the greatest contributions to the
law of contracts by his creation of the law of constructive
conditions, but all of his constructive conditions were promises
and therefore promissory conditions. The Restatement's at-
tempt to distinguish between promises and conditions both
ignores the work of Lord Mansfield and introduces confusion
into the law of conditions.
The essential nature of promissory and non-promissory
conditions and their relation to other conditions, as well as
their relative importance, can be best set forth in table form.
Just below, this is done. It should be noted that in this
classification of conditions non-promissory and promissory
conditions are made the most fundamental and the other con-
ditions are made subsidiary. It should be noted also that
there are no concurrent non-promissory conditions, but that
there are precedent, concurrent and subsequent, as well as
express and constructive promissory conditions.
A. Non-promissory
1. Precedent
a. Express
b. Inferred
2. Subsequent
a. Express
b. Constructive
B. Promissory
1. Precedent
a. Express
b. Constructive
2. Concurrent
a. Express
b. Constructive
3. Subsequent
a. Express
b. Constructive
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §§88, 250, 257,
b, 306, and 357.
260, 266, 293, 294 comment
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2. Illustrations
The existence, importance and relation to other condi-
tions of promissory and non-promissory conditions can fur-
ther be set forth by some illustrations. An illustration of
an express precedent non-promissory condition is found where
there is a promise of a. buyer to pay a certain sum of money
for a suit of clothes, provided he is personally satisfied with
the suit after it has been made for him, in consideration for
a tailor's promise to make such a suit.- If the tailor should
promise to make the suit to the personal satisfaction of the
buyer in consideration for the buyer's promise to pay a
certain sum for it, the personal satisfaction of the buyer
would be a constructive precedent promissory condition.' If
the tailor should promise to make the suit to the personal
satisfaction of the buyer and that he need not pay for it
unless he is satisfied and the buyer should promise to pay
a certain sum for it provided he is personally satisfied, the
personal satisfaction of the buyer would be an express pre-
cedent promissory condition.
Another illustration of an express precedent non-promis-
sory condition would be a promise of an owner to pay, upon
the production of an architect's certificate,5 a certain sum
to a builder who has promised to build a certain building
for him. Where a promisor promises to pay money on "de-
mand" but his duty of performance is otherwise uncondi-
tional, and no other words or usage require a different re-
sult, the right of the promisee to performance is not con-
ditional on a "demand" by him. That is, demand is not an
express non-promissory precedent condition although it seems
to be so made. Usage in the case of bank deposits prescribes
a different result.6
An illustration of an inferred precedent non-promissory
condition is found in the case where a person engaged in a
particular trade or business promises to teach an apprentice
such a trade or business in consideration for some promise
of the apprentice or his father. In such case continuing in
the trade or business is an inferred precedent non-promissory
sBrown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136 (1873).
4 Kendall v. West, 196 Ill. 221, 63 N. E. 683 (1902).
5 Martinsburg etc. Co. v. March, 114 U. S. 549 (1885).
6 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §264.
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condition, so that if the employer goes out of his trade or
business the apprentice is excused from his duty to work
for the other party.7 Another illustration of this kind of
condition would be found where a landlord promises to make
necessary repairs on the inside of a building in consideration
for a promise of a tenant to pay rent. In such case, giving
notice to the landlord of the need of repairs is an inferred
precedent non-promissory condition.8
An illustration of an express subsequent non-promissory
condition is found where there is a sale of a chattel to a buyer
on what is called "a sale or return." In such case, the title
to the chattel passes to the buyer and his duty to pay there-
for arises, but if he decides he wants to return it, he may do
so and this operates as an express subsequent non-promissory
condition to discharge him from his liabilities.9 A sale of this
sort differs from a sale "on trial" in that in the latter case the
approval of the buyer is an express precedent non-promis-
sory condition to his duty.10 Another illustration of an express
subsequent non-promissory condition occurs when there is a
provision in an insurance policy, excusing an insurance com-
pany from a liability which might have accrued under the
policy unless the insured brings suit within one year from
the time of the accruing of the liability.1
An illustration of a constructive subsequent non-promis-
sory condition is found in case of the destruction of a build-
ing in which a promisor has promised to make repairs in
consideration for the other party's promise to pay him there-
for. 2 So in general, where, because of mutual assumption
so-called impossibility operates to discharge a duty of a
promisor, it is on the theory of a constructive subsequent
non-promissory condition.23 But perhaps the neatest illustra-
tion of a constructive subsequent non-promissory condition
is found in a semi-installment contract for the payment of a
sum of money in various installments, where if a party does
not collect the first insallments as they become due and sues
7 Elen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424 (1851).
sMalrn v. Watkinson, L. R. 6 Exch. 25 (1870).
91Ray v. Thompson, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 281 (1853).
10 Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 198 (1868).
11 Semmes v. Hartford Ins. Co., 13 Wall. 158 (U. S. 1871).
12 Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667 (1891).
I3 Howell v. Coupland, L. R. 1 Q.B.D. 258 (1876).
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on the last installment without joining the earlier, the re-
covery on the last installment will operate as a constructive
subsequent non-promissory condition to discharge the debtor's
liability on the earlier installments.14
An illustration of an express precedent promissory con-
dition is found in a case where there is a promise by a seller
to manufacture a certain article for a buyer in consideration
for a promise by the buyer to pay a certain sum therefor
provided the article is manufactured first.15 In such case,
if the article is not manufactured by the seller, the buyer is
both excused from his own duty and given a right to damages
for breach of promise by the other party.
An illustration of a constructive precedent promissory
condition would be found in the above illustration if the
maker should promise to manufacture the article for the
buyer in consideration for the buyer's promise to pay a cer-
tain sum therefor. The making of the above article is made
by law a constructive precedent promissory condition because
it takes time while the payment of the money does not take
time, and under such circumstances fairness requires per-
formance first of that promise which takes time.16 If per-
formance of one promise is fixed before the time fixed for
the performance of another, there is another illustration of
a constructive precedent promissory condition in the perform-
ance which is fixed to occur first.17
An illustration of an express concurrent promissory con-
dition is found in a promise by a seller of land to deed the
land to a buyer provided the buyer pays the sum agreed
upon for the land at the time of the delivery of" the deed. If
in the above case nothing is said by the parties as to when
delivery of deed and payment of money are to occur, delivery
and payment would be a constructive concurrent promissory
condition."'
An illustration of an express subsequent promissory
condition is found where there is a promise on the part of an
14Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N.Y. 41, 25 N. E. 292 (1890).
15 Brocas Case, 3 Leon 219 (1588); Noyes v. Brown, 142 Minn. 211,
171 N. W. 803 (1919).
16Kingston v. Preston, 2 Douglas 689 (1773); Clark v. Gulesian, 197
Mass. 492, 84 N. E. 94 (1908).
17 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709 (1854).
18 Goodisson v. Nunn, 4 T.R. 761 (1792); Morton v. Lamb, 7 T. R.
125 (1797).
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automobile dealer to pay a certain sum of money for a used
car of a prospective buyer upon condition that his promise
shall become void upon his delivery of another new automo-
bile which he has promised to sell to the prospective buyer.19
An illustration of a constructive subsequent promissory
condition is found in a case where the owner of land and
timber promises to convey the same to a prospective buyer
at some time in the future in consideration for the buyer's
promise to pay a certain sum of money therefor. In such
case, there is a constructive subsequent promissory condition
that the owner of the land and timber will not meanwhile
cut any of the timber.20
S. Operation and Significance
The essential nature, characteristics and importance of
promissory and non-promissory conditions will now be in-
vestigated by studying their operation. Probably the best
way to determine whether or not promissory and non-promis-
sory (or casual) conditions have special significance is to
study those branches of the law of contracts where condi-
tions are involved, for the purpose of noticing the operation
of promissory and non-promissory conditions and of compar-
ing them both with precedent, concurrent, and subsequent
conditions and with express and constructive conditions. This
we shall now proceed to do. The fields of contract law
which we shall choose will be performance, assignment, plead-
ing, waiver, discharge, and breach. A study of conditions
in these branches of the law ought to be enough to make it
possible to decide of how much vital significance promissory
and non-promissory conditions are. Do promissory and non-
promissory conditions create different and more difficult
problems than do other kinds of conditions? Do promissory
and non-promissory conditions help more than other kinds
of conditions to an intelligent solution of contract prob-
lems in these fields? Is it necessary to understand these
conditions in order to understand other conditions where
they occur together? Is a knowledge of such conditions nec-
essary to an understanding of the law of performance, as-
signment, pleading, waiver, discharge, and breach? These
19 Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 AtI. 760 (1916).
20 The Duke of St. Albans v. Shore, 1 H. Black. 270 (1789).
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are some of the problems which will confront us and which
we shall have to answer.
A. Performance
(1) Part and Substantial Performance
Substantial performance is something less than full,
strict performance but it is a performance which lacks full,
strict performance only in some non-essential points, is prac-
tically as good as strict performance, and good enough for
both promisor and promisee; but such performance must
be a good faith attempt to fully perform a contract.21
No single definition of part performance can be given.
Part performance may consist of any performance from a
mere trifle to substantial performance. There are four
species of part performance generally recognized in the law
as sufficient to produce legal consequences. One is that kind
of part performance above referred to which is called sub-
stantial performance.2 2  Another is the part performance
necessary to take outside the statute of frauds a promise to
convey land.23 A third kind is that which is enough to give
a right to a quasi-contract.24 And a fourth, that which under
the doctrine of the case of Boone v. Eyre25 has to be enough
so that it prevents any breach going to the root of the con-
tract.26  This latter kind of part performance differs con-
siderably from substantial performance and will have to be
considered along with substantial performance in determin-
ing the law of conditions.
In the case of express non-promissory conditions pre-
cedent, and it should be noted there are no constructive non-
promissory conditions precedent, the majority viewpoint is
that neither part performance nor substantial performance
has any operative effect. The whole condition must happen
21 Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 F. 171 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Dorrance
et al v. Barber & Co., 262 F. 489 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919); Connell v.
Higgins, 170 Cal. 541, 150 Pac. 769 (1915); Morris v. Hokosona,
26 Cal. App. 251, 143 Pac. 826 (1914); Cramer v. Esswein, 220
App. Div. 10, 220 N. Y. S. 634 (1927).
22 Kauffman v. Raeder, 108 F. 171 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901).
28 Overland et al v. Ware et al, 102 Neb. 216, 166 N. W. 611 (1918);
Bowker v. Linton et al, 69 Okla. 280, 172 Pac. 442 (1918); Osborne
v. Osborne, 24 N. M. 96, 172 Pac. 1039 (1918).
2 4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §357.
261 H. Black. 273n (1777).
26 Tichnor Bros. v. Evans, 92 Vt. 278, 102 AtI. 1031 (1918).
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before there is any resulting duty of performance,27 unless
the condition is dispensed with by a constructive non-promis-
sory condition subsequent, which will be discussed later un-
der the heading of "Impossibility." Yet there is a minority
contra viewpoint followed by New York and a few other
states that even a non-promissory express condition precedent
will be dispensed with by substantial performance. 28
Where constructive promissory conditions precedent are
found, either part performance enough for the doctrine of
Boone v. Eyre 2 or substantial performance will be enough
to dispense with the condition precedent. In such a case as
this, substantial performance is not required, so that here,
so far as the results are concerned, it makes no difference
whether there is a substantial performance or part perform-
ance somewhat less than substantial performance. 0 The
original explanation for this result was that promises which
were in the first place dependent promissory conditions prec-
edent would after sufficient part performance become in-
dependent promises. Perhaps a better explanation is that
the condition precedent is by a process of interpretation
made to mean only this amount of part performance while
the duty of the promisor is a duty to give full performance.
On this explanation the promisor is only bound as a con-
dition precedent to render this amount of part performance,
but as a duty he is bound to render full performance; hence,
after his part performance, the defendant's duty arises, but
if the plaintiff does not perform his whole duty, the defend-
ant also has a cause of action. The reason for this position
of the courts is that in case of constructive conditions the
conditions are creatures of the law and under those circum-
stances where justice requires it, the law can mold the
conditions so as to accomplish the goal of justice. For the
same reason substantial performance by the defendant will
have no effect in discharging him from his duty.
It should also be noted that another way whereby this
27 Second Nat. Bank v. Pan-American Bridge Co., 183 F. 391 (C. C. A.
6th, 1910); Martinsburg v. March, 114 U. S. 549 (1885); Hebert
v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 77 N. E. 822 (1906).
28 Nolan et al v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648 (1882); Coplew v. Durand,
153 Cal. 278, 95 Pac. 38 (1908); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS, §303.
291 H. Black 273n (1777).
SOPickens v. BozeU, 11 Ind. 275 (1858); Tichnor Bros. v. Evans, 92
Vt. 278, 102 AtI. 1031! (1918); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §275.
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problem of contract law may be solved is by the law of
quasi-contracts; and many cases, after part performance
by a plaintiff guilty of breach either of a service contract or
a building contract or a contract for the sale of goods, will
permit him to recover for the benefits which he has mean-
while conferred on the other party. But in such a case, the
measure of damages should not be the contract price less the
counter-claim of the defendant for the plaintiff's breach,
but the reasonable value of benefits which the plaintiff has
conferred upon the defendant.3 1
The law as to part or substantial performance of con-
structive promissory conditions precedent ordinarily has no
application to installment contracts because the part perform-
ance or substantial performance of one installment is not
enough for the entire contract, but where the installments
vary in size enough so that a part performance or substantial
performance of a prior installment is a substantial perform-
ance or more than half a performance of the entire contract,
there is no reason why the usual rule should not apply and
there seems to be some authority for this position.32
Where the promissory conditions precedent are express,
the usual rule is that neither substantial performance nor
the Boone v. Eyre kind of part performance is enough, but
that full, strict performance is a condition precedent.3 3 The
reason for this is that the parties have made the full perform-
ance a condition precedent and under these circumstances
the courts do not feel free to mold the condition to accomplish
justice as they do in the case of constructive promissory con-
ditions. This is the rule in the case of non-promissory con-
ditions and there is no reason for distinguishing between
promissory and non-promissory conditions where they are
express. However, New York and many other cases treat
express promissory conditions like constructive promissory
conditions and permit recovery after substantial perform-
ance. 34 It is not clear whether or not these cases would give
31 WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS, §§174-178. In some juris-
dictions following the case of Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481
(1834), recovery is allowed in quasi-contracts though the plaintiff
is guilty of a wilful breach.
32 (1924) 2 Wis. L. Rev. 363; RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS, §317; UNIFORM
SALES ACT, §45; Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, 222 N. Y.
449, 119 N. E. 113 (1918).
1 3 WLSTON, CONTRACTS, §805.
84 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §805.
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the same effect to the Boone v. Eyre part performance, but
probably they would. Otherwise the cases would draw a
distinction between substantial performance and all other
kinds of part performance.
Undoubtedly these minority cases are wrong and any
recovery for part performance of express promissory con-
ditions precedent should be in quasi-contract, 35 and the re-
covery should be the actual value of the benefits covered by
part performance rather than the contract price less a coun-
ter-claim.36 The doctrine of substantial performance, it has
been said, had its origin in the equitable rule giving a decree
of specific performance with compensation for breach;37 but
there is hardly justification for extending the equitable rule
to an action at law so as to allow a plaintiff to recover where
he has not performed an express condition precedent. It is
an unfortunate substitute for the quasi-contractual rule.
So far as the law of part and substantial performance is
concerned, express and constructive conditions have an equal,
or greater, importance than promissory and non-promissory
conditions. Yet this study shows that even in this connection
the classification of promissory and non-promissory condi-
tions is of some importance and an understanding of this
classification helps to clear up the law upon the whole subject.
(2) Performance on Time as a Duty and as a Condition
The happening of some act or event within or on a
specified time may be made an express non-promissory condi-
tion precedent. In such case if the act or event does not hap-
pen within the time specified, of course no duty dependent
thereon will ever arise. In the same way a promise to per-
form at sometime in the future or before sometime in the
future makes the elapse of time between the making of the
contract and such future time an inferred non-promissory
condition precedent, but since this time is bound to occur,
it is never spoken of nor emphasized as a condition. Where
time is an express non-promissory condition, time is just as
important as it is where a person has been given either a
sr-Wolff, Substantial Performance of Contracts in New York, (1931)
16 Corn. L. Q. 180; Henry v. Jons et al, 164 Iowa 364, 145 N. W.
909 (1914); Kelly & Bragg v. Bradford, 33 Vt. 35 (1860); Blood
v. Wilson, 141 Mass. 25, 6 N. E. 362 (1886).
Be Gillis et al v. Cobe 'et al, 177 Mass. 584, 59 N. E. 455 (1901).
S7 HARIMAEN, CONTRACTS, §340.
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mere revocable power or an irrevocable power through an
option contract. Here, of course, he has a power only for
the time designated and when that time has expired, his
power has expired.38
Time raises a problem not where privileges and powers
but where rights and duties are involved. That is, generally,
where there are promissory conditions. Where there is a
promissory condition relating to time whether time is of the
essence or not has no meaning so far as the promise is con-
cerned because a person must perform his promise according
to its terms. A breach of any promise whether vital or not
will give rise to a cause of action 9 But where there is a
promissory condition, the condition part of the promissory
condition varies with whether or not time is of the essence
of the contract. Time may be made of the essence of a con-
tract by making a promise an express promissory condition
precedent. Saying that time is the essence of the contract
has the operative effect of making performance on time an
express promissory condition precedent.40  Even though the
parties do not make performance on time an express prom-
issory condition precedent either directly or by making time
of the essence of the contract, time is made of the essence
by construction of law even in the case of constructive prom-
issory conditions precedent where the contract is a mercantile
contract or one involving objects which fluctuate in value.4'
Where time is of the essence of the contract, one who does
not perform a promissory condition precedent is not only
guilty of breach of promise but his non-performance on the
exact time excuses the other party from his duty to perform. 42
In other cases, and this is especially true of contracts
relating to real property, labor, and building, time is not of
the essence. Here, of course, one is liable for breach of his
promise, but the nature of the condition is not what it was
where time is made of the essence of the contract. Where
time is not of the essence of the contract, the constructive
'
8 Lord Ranelagh v. Melton, 2 Drew. & S. 278 (1864); Winders v.
Kenan, 161 N. C. 628, 77 S. E. 687 (1913).
39 Freeman v. Robinson, 238 Mass. 449, 131 N. E. 75 (1921).
4 0 Hoffman v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 146 Ore. 66, 29 P.
(2d) 557 (1934).
41 Kentucky Distilleries etc. & Co. et al v. Warwick Co., 109 F. 280
(C. C. A. 6th, 1901); WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §§845-855.
42 Mazzotta v. Bornstein et al, 104 Conn. 430, 133 Atl. 677 (1926).
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promissory condition precedent is by construction of law
made to mean not performance on the exact time, but per-
formance within a reasonable length of time thereafter.
So that even though a promisor is guilty of delay if he
tenders performance within a reasonable length of time,
though he may be guilty of breach of promise, he may still
hold the other party to the performance of his duty.43
The doctrine which we have just discussed applies to
installment contracts.44 The reasonable length of time al-
lowed a party will also be more in the case of a breach after
part performance than it will after a breach in limine.45
Specific performance- will be governed by the same rules
which have been given aboveY.4
From this examination of the rules of law governing
conditions involving time, it will be seen that whether con-
ditions are precedent, concurrent, or subsequent is of little
importance; and that whether they are express or construc-
tive is of little more importance; but the important thing is
whether or not they are promissory or non-promissory. The
important thing is the distinction between the liability on the
promise and the excuse of a duty because of the non-per-
formance of a condition precedent. The law on these matters
can be adequately understood only by a full understanding
of the law of promissory and non-promissory conditions. The
next most important problem in this connection is that of
determining when time is of the essence and when it is not;
but this problem is not settled by the law of express and
constructive or precedent, concurrent, and subsequent any
more than by the law of promissory and non-promissory con-
ditions.
(3) Reasonable Man Standard
Where there is a condition of personal satisfaction,
there arises the question of whether the person whose duty
depends upon such condition is the sole judge of whether or
43 King v. Connors, 222 Mass. 261, 110 N. E. 289 (1915).
44 Harton v. Hildebrand et al., 230 Pa. 335, 79 Atl. 571 (1911).
4 Beck etc. v. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 52 F. 700 (C. C. A.
8th, 1892); Poussard v. Spiers & Pond, 1 Q. B. D. 410 (1876);
Bettini v. Gye, 1 Q. B. D. 183 (1876).
46 St. Regis Paper Co. v. The Santa Clara Lumber Co., 186 N. Y. 89,
78 N. E. 701 (1906).
47RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §276 and §313c.
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not the condition has happened, or whether the happening
of the condition will depend upon a reasonable man standard.
The courts have sometimes made the particular individual
the sole judge and sometimes the reasonable man the judge;
hence the real problem is to determine when one and when
the other is the judge.
Some courts have attempted to draw the line between
cases (1) where fancy, taste, sensibility, or judgment is in-
volved and (2) where only operative fitness or mechanical
utility is involved; and to make the individual party the
judge in the first case and the reasonable man in the second.48
However, the cases adopting this test, or distinction, have
been so confusing in drawing the line49 that this test has
become practically meaningless. A better distinction is be-
tween express conditions and constructive conditions.
Where there is an express promissory condition prece-
dent making a party the sole judge and there is no doubt
about this, the overwhelming weight og. authority is that
there is no recovery if the party says that he is not satis-
fied, whether the contract involves taste or workmanship,
or a sale on trial, or a sale or return, in the absence of bad
faith.50 If there is to be any recovery under such circum-
stances, it must be in quasi-contract.51 However, California,2
48 Tiffany v. Pacific Sewer Pipe Co., 180 Cal. 700, 182 Pac. 428 (1919).
49 Marcus v. Nelson, 119 N. Y. S. 1085 (1909); Brenner v. Redlick
Furniture Co., 113 Cal. App. 343, 298 Pac. 62 (1931). Since 1906
twenty-one states have gone on record in favor of the rules above
announced. McCartney v. Badovinac, 62 Colo. 76, 160 Pac. 190
(1916); Zaleski v. Clark, 44 Conn. 218 (1876); Hawken v. Daley
et ux, 85 Conn. 16, 81 Atl. 1053 (1911); Raisler Sprinkler Co. v.
Automatic Sprinkler Co. of America, 6 W. W. Harr. 57 (1934);
Hay v. Hassett et al, 174 Iowa 601, 156 N. W. 734 (1916); Devoine
Co., Inc. v. International Co., Inc., 151 Md. 690 (1927); Bowen
v. Buckner, 183 S. W. 704 (Mo. App. 1916); Bailey v. Goldberg,
236 Mich. 29, 209 N. W. 805 (1926); Grobarchick v. Nasa Mort-
gage & Invest. Co., 117 N. J. L. 33, 186 Atl. 433 (1936); Lippin-
cott et al v. Warren Apartment Co., 307 Pa. 320, 161 Atl. 330
(1932); Peck-Williamson Heat. and Vent. Co. v. McKnight &
Merz, 140 Tenn. 563, 205 S. W. 419 (1918); Blue v. Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co., 106 W. Va. 642, 147 S. E. 22 (1929).
5o Gerisch v. Herold, 82 N. J. L. 605, 83 Atl. 892 (1912); Williams
Mfg. Co. v. Standard Brass Co., 173 Mass. 356, 53 N. E. 862 (1899).
5" Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481 (1834); Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. W. 759 (1913).52 Brenner v. Redlick Furniture Co., 113 Cal. App. 343, 298 Pac. 62
(1931).
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Massachusetts,5 3 New York,t4 and Rhode Island55 permit re-
covery in contract according to the reasonable man test in
the case of worlmanship and materials. The fact of sub-
stantial performance would not make any difference in the
recovery because the rule as to substantial performance is
like the rule just given.
Where the condition of personal satisfaction is an ex-
press non-promissory condition, the rule is the same as
where the condition is a promissory condition; and in the
absence of bad faith and doubt, the person whose duty de-
pends upon such condition is the sole judge.so
Where personal satisfaction is a constructive promissory
condition precedent (and, of course, where there is doubt
as td whether a person is expressly made sole judge and
where there is bad faith), the determination of the question
of whether or not the condition has been performed is ac-
cording to the reasonable man test.5 7  The rule as to part
performance might not necessarily run parallel with the
rule above given because there might be recovery in case
of part performance of a constructive promissory condition
precedent even though a reasonable man might not be sat-
isfied. Of course in the case of a constructive condition,
good faith is required.58 Another question which arises in
53 MacDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mlass. 439, 156 N. E. 740 (1927).
54 Caro v. Newmark et al, 197 N. Y. S. 426 (1922).
5 Hanaford v. Stevens & Co. Inc., 39 R. I. 182, 98 Atl. 209 (1916).
VG Gibson v. Cranage, Jr., 39 Mich. 49 (1878). Since 1906 the following
cases have followed the case just cited: Jones v. Lanier, 198 Ala.
363, 73 So. 535 (1916); Goldberg v. Feldmon, 108 Md. 330, 70 At.
245 (1908); McCrimmon v. Murray, 43 Mont. 457, 117 Pac. 73
(1911) ; Williams v. Hirshorn, 91 N. J. L. 419, 103 Atl. 23 (1918);
Solomon v. Ford, 108 Pa. Super. 43, 164 At. 92 (1933); Atlas
Torpedo Co. v. United States Torpedo Co., 15 S. W. (2d) 150
(Tex. 1929).
57Bridgeford & Co. v. Meagher, 144 Ky. 479, 139 S. W. 750 (1911).
Since 1906 the following cases have rendered decisions in accord-
ance with the foregoing case: Hoff v. L. Gould & Co., 198 Ill.
App. 499 (1916); Burns v. Reis, 196 Mo. App. 694, 191 S. W.
1096 (1917); Waite v. C. E. Shoemaker & Co., 50 Mont. 264,
146 Pac. 736 (1915); Melson v. Turner, 125 Neb. 603, 251 N. W.
172 (1933); Lumbermen's National Bank of Portland v. Minor,
65 Ore. 412, 133 Pac. 87 (1913); Morgan v. Gamble et al, 230
Pa. 165, 79 Atl. 410 (1911); Janssen v. Muller. 38 S. D. 611,
162 N. W. 393 (1917); Fessman v. Barnes, 108 S. W. 170 (Tex.
1908); Yarno v. Hedlund Box & Lumber Co., 129 Wash. 457, 225
Pac. 659 (1924); Midgley et al v. Campbell Bldg. Co., 38 Utah
293, 112 Pac. 820 (1911).
rsWILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §675a.
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the case of a constructive promissory condition is whether
both the promise and the condition are governed by the rea-
sonable man rule or only the condition. If the analogy of
the condition of time were to be foliowed, the reasonable
man standard would affect only the condition.
So far as the reasonable man standard is concerned, the
most important classification of conditions is that of express
and constructive.
B. Assigmnent
A promisee may assign any right59 unless it varies the
duty of the promisor or the assignment is forbidden by stat-
ute, public policy, or the contract; 60 but no one can assign
a mere license,61 nor a privilege or power,6 2 nor a duty,
though if the duty is one which can be performed through a
servant or agent, one who assigns his right may delegate
the performance of his duty to the assignee of the right.6 1
It follows as a consequence that a mere non-promissory con-
dition cannot be assigned and the same thing is true of the
condition part of a promissory condition. This is true both
because the condition creates only a privilege and because
the condition is so attached to the duty that it is not allowed
in any way to be separated from the duty. But a right
whether created by a promissory condition precedent either
express or constructive, or a right dependent upon the prior
performance of either a promissory or a non-promissory
condition may be assigned. However, in such case the as-
signee takes the right as modified either by the non-promis-
sory or promissory condition in the same way that the as-
signor took the right. That is, if the duty of the other party
was modified by a condition before assignment, it continues
to be so modified after assignment.64
In the case of assignment, the only conditions which have
59 Jemison v. Tindall, 89 N. J. L. 429, 99 Atl. 408 (1916); Wilkins v.
Hardaway, 159 Ala. 565, 48 So. 678 (1909).6 0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §151.
61 Marsbon v. Carter, 12 N. H. 159 (1841).
62 Boulton v. Jones and another, 2 H. & N. 564 (1857).
63 Devlin v. The Mayor etc. of New York, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875); British
Waggon Co. et al v. Lea & Co., 5 Q. B. D. 149 (1880); American
Lithographic Co. v. Ziegler, 216 Mass. 287, 103 N. E. 909 (1914);
Eastern Advertising Co. v. McGaw, 89 Md. 72, 42 Atl. 923 (1899).
64 Homer v. Shaw, 212 Mass. 113, 98 N. E. 697 (1912); American
Bridge Co. et al v. Boston, 202 Mass, 374, 88 N. E. 1089 (1909).
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any special significance are promissory and non-promissory
conditions.
C. Pleading and Proof
The plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the
performance and happening of all conditions precedent, ex-
cept in case of insurance, whether they are express promissory
conditions or constructive promissory conditions or express
non-promissory conditions.6 5 So far as pleading is concerned,
the law knows no special class of constructive conditions.
And the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving a
readiness and willingness to perform a promissory concurrent
condition, express or constructive." The defendant has the
burden of pleading and proving the performance or happen-
ing of all conditions subsequent,67 and even, for practical
reasons, the happening of conditions precedent in insurance
cases.68
So far as pleading and proving the happening or per-
formance of conditions, the only classification of conditions
which has any special significance is that of precedent, con-
current, and subsequent.
D. Discharge
(1) Waiver
A modern text writer is of the opinion that there is no
such thing as waiver, and that what is often spoken of as
waiver is either estoppel, or election, or discharge by some
kind of contract,6 9 and consequently he called his book Waiver
Distributed.-M
There certainly has been a lot of confusion of waiver
with contract, election, and estoppel. Courts have sometimes
said waiver is "in the nature of a contract."71 Again it has
been said "waiver equally with its counterpart of election per-
65 McGowin v. Menken, 223 N. Y. 509, 119 N. E. 877 (1918).
WjI LIs, Assumpist, 3 STANDARD ENCY. OF PRO., 186.
67Northwestern National Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 56 Okla. 188, 155
Pac. 524 (1916); The Wilmington & R. R. Co. v. Robeson, 2T
N. C. 321 (1845).
C Benanti v. Delaware Ins. Co., 86 Conn. 15, 84 Atl. 109 (1912).
0. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED.
7oEwart, Waiver in Insurance Law, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 970. See
also Vance, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Law, (1925) 34
Yale L. J. 834.
71 Kiernan v. The Dutchess County Mutual Ins. Co., 150 N. Y. 190,
44 N. E. 698 (1896).
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vades nearly every department of the law.' ' 72 Again the courts
have said "the doctrine of waiver rests upon estoppel" and
"the terms waiver and estoppel... are so nearly alike and as
applied in the law of insurance so alike in the consequences
which follow their successful application that they are used
indiscriminately."' 3 If waiver is a separate topic and method
of discharge, it requires none of the essentials of a contract
but a mere voluntary relinquishment of some advantage;
it requires no choice between two or more alternatives but
only the giving up of one freedom of action; and it re-
quires no reliance upon a statement but a mere voluntary
surrender. Hence none of the above quoted statements should
be made.
Distinguishing waiver as above suggested, Mr. Ewart
seems to be right so far as rights are concerned. There can
be no waiver of a right. In order to relinquish a right a
person must either be guilty of estoppel, election, or the
making of a contract. This principle was thoroughly estab-
lished by the case of Foakes v. Beer 7 4 and this case has been
followed almost everywhere in the United States.7 5 In spite
of this well-established rule, the courts somewhat inconsist-
ently do permit disclaimer in the case of a contract under seal
and in the case of a third party beneficiary contract.76
Yet though Mr. Ewart seems to have made his case
so far as concerns rights, he seems to be entirely wrong
so far as concerns privileges, powers, and immunities. So
far as all of these matters are concerned, there is an abund-
ance of authority for the proposition that waiver in its nar-
rower sense is a method of discharge. Thus there may be
waived the privilege of jury trial77 as well as any of the
7 2
BISHOP, CONTRACTS (2d), p. 329.
73 Ervay v. Fire Ass'n. of Phialdelphia, 119 Iowa 304, 93 N. W. 290(1903); MAY, INSURANCE, Vol. 2, p. 1203.
2
4 L. R. 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884).
75 Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559 (1850); Jackson v. Security Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 233 Ill. 161, 84 N. E. 198 (1908); Bender v. Been,
78 Iowa 283, 43 N. W. 216 (1889); Call et al v. Pinson et al, 180
Ky. 367, 202 S. W. 883 (1918); Zinke v. Knights of the Macca-
bees of the World, 275 Mo. 6601 205 S. W. 1 (1918); Decker v.
George W. Smith & Co., 88 N. J. L. 630, 96 Atl. 915 (1916);
Sherman v. Pacific Coast Pipe Co., 60 Old. 103, 159 Pac. 333(1916); Clark v. Summerfield Co., 40 R. I. 254, 100 Atl. 499(1917); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11 Vt. 60 (1839).
76RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §104 and §137.
7 Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930).
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procedural privileges guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.7 8 The
power of acceptance of an offer may be waived either by a
counter offer or by a rejection, and so may the power of
avoidance of a contract by a ratification.79  In the same way
an immunity, like an immunity from taxation or garnishment,
may be waived by a mere statement or conduct from which
such intention may be inferred.80 Consequently, waiver should
be defined as a voluntary relinquishment of a privilege, power,
or immunity. Defined in this sense, it is very clear that here
is some waiver which Mr. Ewart did not distribute. And we
shall use waiver in this sense in our investigation of waiver
in its relation to promissory and non-promissory conditions.
In the case of promissory conditions the promise part
of the promissory condition creates a right and in accordance
with the law we have already set forth, this right cannot be
waived ;81 in order to terminate such a right there must be
estoppel, 82 or election, 3 or a new contract ;84 but the condition
part of the promissory condition may be waived because it
creates only a privilege. 5 It makes no difference whether
the promissory condition is an express condition or a con-
structive condition because there is a promise in one case
as much as the other.
Non-promissory conditions, which must be express if
precedent but may be either express or constructive if subse-
quent, create only privileges and like other privileges they
are subject to waiver. A great many conditions of this sort
occur in insurance contracts. In such cases the courts hold
that waiver alone without estoppel is enough to wipe out a
condition. 8 Conditions of this sort in bills and notes may be
78 WILLIS, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW, 524, 527, 531, 542, and 558.
79 Wittwver v. Hurwitz et al, 216 N. Y. 259, 110 N. E. 433 (1915);
Minneapolis Etc. R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill Co., 119 U. S.
149 (1886).
so Sturges v. Jackson, 88 Miss. 508, 40 So. 547 (1906).
5s Jobst v. Hayden Bros., 84 Neb. 735, 121 N. W. 957 (1909).
8 2 Jobst v. Hayden Bros., 84 Neb. 735, 121 N. W. 957 (1909).
S3 Catholic Foreign Missionary Soc. of America v. Oussani, 215 N. Y. 1,
109 N. E. 80 (1915).
84 Shallenberger v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 223 Pa. 220, 72 Atl.
500 (1909).
95 Craig v. Lane, 212 Mass. 195, 98 N. E. 685 (1912).
sG Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Pitcher, 160 Ind. 392, 64 N. E. 921 (1902).
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waived. 17 In the interesting case of Clark v. West88 the court
held that the condition of keeping sober was a non-promissory
condition and that it therefore could be waived. However,
the courts hold that to give one a right to sue another party
when there is a condition precedent to the defendant's duty,
any waiver to give the plaintiff a cause of action must occur
before the institution of the suit.8 9
Prevention, though it is a form of breach, may also oper-
ate as a form of waiver where there is a non-promissory
condition precedent. Prevention by the promisor will amount
to a waiver of the condition20 Prevention by the promisee of
the happening of such a condition will have no operative ef-
fect because he will be estopped to say that the condition
has happened. Prevention by the promisee of the promisor's
performance of his promissory condition precedent will
amount both to a waiver of the promissory condition and a
breach on the part of the promisee.91 A prevention by the
promisor of himself to perform a promissory condition pre-
cedent will amount to a breach, 92 and it will excuse a con-
current condition to be performed by the other party. 3 But
in the case of promissory conditions the fact that the defend-
ant may make himself guilty of breach and may excuse a
condition of the plaintiff does not also excuse any duty which
the plaintiff has to perform or the duty part of a promissory
condition. 4
This study of the topic of waiver shows conclusively that
so far as this topic is concerned, the conditions which have
the most significance are promissory and non-promissory con-
ditions. It makes no difference whether the conditions are
express or implied, precedent, concurrent or subsequent, but it
does make all the difference in the world as to whether they
are promissory or non-promissory.
8? Stanley et al v. McElrath, 86 Cal. 449, 26 Pac. 800 (1890); McKenna
v. Vernon, 258 Pa. 18, 101 AtI. 919 (1917).
88193 N. Y. 349, 86 N. E. 1 (1908).
89A. D. Granger Co. v. Brown-Ketcham Iron Works, 204 N. Y. 218,
97 N. E. 523 (1912).
DO E. 1. DuPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 F. 353
(C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
91 Patterson v. Meyerhofer, 204 N. Y. 96, 97 N. E. 472 (1912).
92 Clark v. Gulesian, 197 Mass. 492, 84 N. E. 94 (1908).
9' Mary Short v. Stone, 8 Q. B. 358 (1846).
0 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. W. 759 (1913).
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(2) Impossibility
Anglo-American courts have not made impossibility as
such a defense as they might have done,9 5 or as they might
have made impossibility created by law a defense of illegality.
They also have not made any defense allowed a matter of the
intention of the parties although they might have done this."8
They have preferred to make impossibility as such have no
operative effect either to prevent the making of a contract
or to discharge a contract.9 7  However, where the parties
have made a mutual assumption as to some matter of law,
or of fact, as the basis for their performance, the courts,
where this is done, will make impossibility, or impracticibility,
or almost anything else, a non-promissory constructve condi-
tion subsequent (or sometimes precedent), and this condi-
tion will operate to discharge either a non-promissory condi-
tion precedent or any promissory condition express or con-
structive in a contract.
98
The non-promissory conditions which are likely to be dis-
charged by this kind of a constructive non-promissory con-
dition subsequent are those found in insurance policies and
in architect certificates. Thus where a policy of insurance
provides for forfeiture for non-payment of premiums on time,
this express non-promissory condition in the policy will be
discharged (or suspended) by a constructive non-promissory
condition subsequent of war where the parties deal on the
mutual assumption of peace.9  An express non-promissory
condition precedent of the production of an architect's certi-
ficate will be discharged by a constructive non-promissory
condition subsequent of death, or collusion, or spite, because
parties are assumed to deal on a mutual assumption that the
architect is going to continue to live, or will not be guilty
of collusion, or spite. 100
PZ GOTTSCHALX, IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE IN CONTRACTS 48, 95.
90 Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Perform-
ance, (1920) 18 Mich. L. Rev. 589.
97 King v. Braine, Owen 60 (1579) ; Fargo et al v. Wade, 72 Ore. 477, 142
Pac. 830 (1914) ; Superintendent etc. of Trenton v. Bennett et
al, 27 N. J. L. 513 (1859); Whitman v. Anglum, 92 Conn. 392, 103
Atl. 114 (1918).
9,8 Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826 (1863); Hawkes v. Kehoe et
al, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907).
93VANCE, INSURANCE, 219; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §307.
100 Hebert v. Dewey, 191 Mass. 403, 77 N. E. 82Z (1906) ; Martinsburg
v. March, 114 U. S. 549 (1885).
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The best illustrations of the discharge of promissory
conditions both as promises and as conditions by a construc-
tive non-promissory condition subsequent are found in cases
of prospective disablement, insolvency, destruction of the
object to which a contract relates, death, failure of a con-
templated means of performance, failure of a necessary means
of performance, war, and frustration of the purpose of a
contract. A constructive promissory condition precedent to
deliver ties along side for cash is excused by a constructive
non-promissory condition subsequent of failure to make
preparation to pay cash, on the theory that the parties dealt
on this mutual assumption. 10' A constructive promissory con-
dition concurrent to convey land in exchange for other land
is excused by a constructive non-promissory condition subse-
quent of failure of title where the parties have dealt on this
mutual assumption. 10 2  A constructive promissory condition
precedent to deliver merchandise for a promise to pay there-
for on future credit is discharged so far as the credit is con-
cerned by a constructive non-promissory condition subsequent
of insolvency. 0 3 A constructive promissory condition prec-
edent of the lease of a music hall is discharged by a con-
structive non-promissory condition subsequent of the con-
tinued existence of the music hall.104 A constructive promis-
sory condition concurrent of the conveyance of land is ex-
cused by a constructive non-promissory condition subsequent
of the destruction of a building.05 A constructive promissory
condition precedent to work is discharged by a constructive
non-promissory condition subsequent of death. 10 A con-
structive promissory condition precedent to raise cotton is
discharged by a constructive non-promissory condition subse-
quent of failure of crop when the parties expected the cotton
to be raised on particular land.10 7 A duty to give an annual
101 McCormick et al v. Tappendorf et al, 51 Wash. 312, 99 Pac. 2, (1909).
102 Caporale v. Rubine, 92 N. J. L. 463, 105 Atl. 226 (1918).
103 Pardee v. Kanady et al, 100 N. Y. 121, 2 N. E. 885 (1885).
104Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best. & S. 826 (1863).
105 Hawkes v. Kehoe et al, 193 Mass. 419, 79 N. E. 766 (1907).
%06 Yerrington v. Greene et al, 7 R. I. 589 (1863). This case held
that there was a constructive non-promissory condition subsequent
of death by either party. There is no logical necessity for this.
The mutual assumption might very well relate to the continued
life of only one party. Phillips v. Alhambra Palace Co. 1901,
1 K. B. D. 59; Toland, Admr. v. Stevenson, 59 Ind. 485 (1877).
107 C. G. Davis & Co. v. Bishop, 139 Ark. 273, 213 S. W. 744 (1919).
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pass is discharged by a constructive non-promissory condition
subsequent of a law prohibiting the issuance of passes.108
A duty to pay a royalty for iron is discharged by a con-
structive non-promissory condition subsequent of a failure of
iron to mine. 10 9 A duty to pay for gravel for a bridge is dis-
charged by a constructive non-promissory condition subse-
quent of impossibility to get the gravel above the water
level. 110 A constructive promissory condition precedent to
transport gold is discharged by a constructive non-promissory
condition subsequent of war."' A constructive promissory
condition precedent to build a floor in a building is dis-
charged by a constructive non-promissory condition of the
continued existence of the building as a necessary means of
performance. 112 A duty to pay for rooms hired to view a
coronation parade is discharged by a constructive non-promis-
sory condition subsequent of frustration of the object, where
the king's illness postponed the pageant. The reason for all
these non-promissory conditions subsequent is the mutual as-
sumption as to some matter on the basis of which the parties
are held to have dealt."3
It should be noted that the courts are beginning to
create contract duties as well as quasi-contract, public utility,
and trust duties by construction of law." 4 Where the courts
create a contract duty in this way without a promise, it should
be excused by a subsequently occuring accident even though
there is no mutual assumption. Thus a constructive duty to
exercise diligence should be excused by a strike."15
The question of when there is a mutual assumption is
10 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. W. 759 (1913).
Note that in this case a duty rather than a promissory condition
was discharged. A promissory condition precedent had already
been performed. For this reason after the discharge of the con-
tract duty the court created a quasi-contract for the party who
had already performed.
109 Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co. v. Graham et al, 124 Va. 692, 98
S. E. 659 (1919).
-10 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard et al, 172 Cal. 289, 156 Pac. 458
(1916).
"'North German Lloyd v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 U. S. 12 (1917).
112 Carroll v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 Pac. 143 (1917).
1s Chandler v. Webster, 1 K. B. 493 (1904).
114Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214(1917); (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 141.
al Richland S. S. Co. v. Buffalo Dry Dock Co., 254 F. 668 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918).
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a question of law and not of fact.116 But there is no test nor
formula for determining the action of the court other than
the reasonable man test. Apparently the court puts itself in
the place of a reasonable man and determines whether or not
the parties if they had thought about the matter would have
contemplated some matter as the basis for their performance
of their duties.17
So far as the topic of impossibility is concerned, non-
promissory conditions are more important than any other
kinds of conditions, because they operate to discharge but
there can be no breach of them. The constructive condition
read into the contract in all of the cases is a non-promissory
condition. It is also a condition subsequent, but the fact that
it is non-promissory is fully as important as that it is subse-
quent. Of course it is also constructive and this is a matter
of considerable importance, but not so important as that
it is non-promissory. It is also important to know that this
condition may operate upon both non-promissory and promis-
sory conditions precedent.
Of course prevention is another kind of impossibility,
but with the topic of impossibility rationalized as it has to
be under Anglo-American law, it has seemed better to treat
prevention under the topic of waiver.
(3) Miscellaneous
So far as other methods of discharge are concerned (ex-
cept breach), it makes no difference whether the conditions
are promissory or non-promissory, express or constructive,
precedent, concurrent, or subsequent. Any and all of them,
for example, can be discharged by estoppel, or by a consensual
substituted contract, or an accord, or a contract of rescission,
or a contract of novation, or a contract of arbitration. In the
case of a breach of a promissory condition precedent, if the
other elects to treat it as a discharge and if, in the case of
failure of performance, it goes to the essense of the contract,
the breach will have the operative effect of discharge.
E. Breach
A breach of contract is a legal wrong, and there is a
116Kinzer Construction Co. v. State of New York, 125 N. Y. S. 46
(1910).
Ii? Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co., 6 App. Cas. 38 (1881); Buffalo and
Lancaster v. Bellevue, 165 N. Y. 247, 59 N. E. 5 (1901); Sturge,
The Doctrine of Implied Conditions, (1925) 41 L. Q. Rev. 170-1.
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breach of contract whether or not it goes to the essence of
the contract or whether or not the other party elects to treat
it as a breach except in the case of anticipatory breach. But
there can be no legal wrong except where a person fails to
discharge his duty. For this reason, of course, there can.be
no breach of a non-promissory condition or the non-promissory
phase of a promissory condition; and it makes no difference
whether the non-promissory condition is express or construc-
tive, or precedent, concurrent, or subsequent. However, as al-
ready above shown, the prevention of a non-promissory con-
dition precedent by one who is under duty operates as a
waiver of such condition.
Breach of contract may occur not only in the case of a
duty created by an independent promise but also in case of a
duty created by a promissory condition whether express or
constructive, whether precedent, concurrent, or subsequent,
and this breach may arise either by failure of performance,""
or by prevention, 19 or by repudiation.120  According to the
weight of Anglo-American authority, a breach may be an
anticipatory breach before the time for performance, as well
as an actual breach at the time of performance, except in the
ease of independent promises and a promise in a unilateral
contract, at least after the other party before a retraction
elects to treat the breach as a breach.' 2' The anticipatory
breach doctrine affects the law of conditions the same as an
actual breach. Ordinarily where there is an installment con-
tract, a breach of a first installment will not amount to a total
breach of the entire contract; but if the breach of a prior
installment is enough to go to the root of the entire contract,
it will amount to a total breach 222
So far as breach is concerned, it is apparent that the
distinction between promissory and non-promissory conditions
318 Bettini v. Gye, 1 Q. B. D. 183 (1876).
119 E. I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 F. 353
(C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Canda v. Wick, 100 N. Y. 127, 2 N. E. 381
(1885).
120 Torkomian Jr. v. Russell et al, 90 Conn. 481, 97 Atl. 760 (1916).
221 Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E. & B. 678 (1852); Rayburn et al v.
Comstock et al, 80 Mich. 457, 45 N. W. 382 (1890); Lagerloef
Trading Co. Inc. v. American Paper Products Co. of Ind., 291 F.
947 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
122 United Press Ass'n. v. The National Newspaper Ass'n., 237 F. 547
(C. C. A. 8th, 1916); UNIFORM SALES ACT, §45; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS, §317.
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is more important than that between other conditions, be-
cause there can be no breach of non-promissory conditions
but there can be a breach of promissory conditions.
F. Irrevocable Powers
According to Mr. Williston and the Restatement of Con-
tracts, an irrevocable power is a right and a contract.12 3  Is
this position correct? Can there be an irrevocable power
which is not a right? For example, where an offeror offers
a promise for an act and a part of the act has been per-
formed, does the offeree have an irrevocable power, because
after part performance he acquires an immunity against the
offeror revoking his offer, or does he have a right? The
Restatement says that he has a right and the offeror is
bound by a contract "the duty of immediate performance of
which is conditional on the full consideration being given." It
must be assumed that the condition spoken of is an internal
constructive non-promissory condition. If this is a correct
interpretation of the factual situation, undoubtedly this con-
dition is one which should have been discussed heretofore.
But the writer of this article takes the position that in the
hypothetical the offeree does not as yet have a right or a
contract, and therefore there is no condition to be discussed.
Yet the writer believes that the situation, since it involves the
law of privileges and power, is analogous to the situations
we have heretofore discussed in the case of non-promissory
conditions, and that the answer to the problem thereby raised
will have to be found in the law above set forth.
The courts have not agreed in their answers to the hypo-
thetical above set forth. Some courts unjustly have said
that in such case part performance by the offeree amounts
to nothing, so that the offeror still has the power of revoca-
tion and the power of the offeree does not become irrevoc-
able. 24 Other courts illogically have held that part perform-
ance makes the unilateral contract bilateral. 125  Other cases
illogically have held that part performance amounts to an
acceptance and creates a unilateral contract. 2 6  Still other
cases have held that the beginning of performance destroys
123 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §45.
124 Stensgaard v. Smith, 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 669 (1890); Petterson,
Ex. v. Pattberg, 248 N. Y. 86, 161 N. E. 428 (1928).
125 Braniff et al v. Blair et al, 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816 (1917).
128Brackenbury et al v. Hodgkin et al, 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106
(1917).
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the offeror's power of revocation and makes the offeree's
power irrevocable.127 A variant on this last position is that
part performance operates as injurious reliance on the offer
so as to create an option contract to keep the offer open.1 2 8
The writer takes the position that the correct holding is
that part performance creates an irrevocable power, because
the offeror has lost his power of revocation, but that there is
no contract as yet, though the offeree has the power by com-
pleting the rest of the act to make a contract. Accepting this
as the correct rationale, why is this irrevocable power not a
right? The first argument is the argument of offer and ac-
ceptance itself. The offeror has given the offeree a power by
performing a designated act to create a contract. There can
be no contract until that power has been exercised. An exer-
cise of a part of the power by doing a part of the act is not
enough. The offeror would still have his power of revocation
were it not for the fact that by allowing the offeree to partly
perform he has allowed the offeree to acquire an immunity.
If the offeree has only a power under the law already
developed, he may waive it; but if he has a right, he has some-
thing which he cannot waive. It is believed that the offeree
may waive his power of acceptance even after his part per-
formance. Again, if the offeree has only an irrevocable
power, he has nothing which he can assign; but if he has a
right, of course that can be assigned. Again, it is believed
that the offeree has nothing which is capable of assignment.
In the same way, if the offeree has a right and a contract, the
offeror can break this contract. After the offeror has broken
his contract, the law would forbid the offeree to enhance his
damages,12D and thus it would be impossible for him to per-
form the rest of the act which the Restatement and Mr. Willis-
ton make a condition to the liability of the breacher. Still
further to show the fallacy of the Restatement's position, sup-
pose that an offeror makes to the general public an offer of
a reward of $1000 for finding and returning to him in good
condition an automobile which has been stolen from him, and
suppose a hundred people immediately begin to perform some
227 Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086
(1902); Ruess v. Baron, 10 P. (2d) 518 (Cal. App. 1932); Offord
v. Davies, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 748 (1862).
328 McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, (1914) 27 Harv. L. Rev. 644.
12 Lagerloef Trading Co. Inc. v. American Paper Products Co. of Ind.,
291 F. 947 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923).
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of the acts required for finding and returning this automo-
bile. After part performance by all one hundred of these
offerees suppose the offeror should repudiate his offer (con-
tract). Would he be liable for breach of contract to all one
hundred of these offerees? This hypothetical and these argu-
ments ought to be enough to show that the offeree does not
have a contract right but only an irrevocable power. The
students referred to in another note have searched diligently
for any cases on these points, but they have been unable to
find any. It is too bad that the courts have not settled the
question either on the basis of waiver, or assignment, or
breach; but, because they have not, the only answer which
can be given is an answer of logic, and it seems to the writer
that the logical answer is as above given. And with that
answer of course the question of waiver, assignment, and
breach will have to be answered in the same way that a non-
promissory condition would be answered, because only privi-
leges, powers and immunities are concerned.
If the offeror should prevent the offeree's performance of
the rest of the act called for by the offer, it might well be
held that this act (which is really an external condition prece-
dent to the formation of a unilateral contract) had been
waived so that in that case the offeree would acquire a right
and the offeror would be liable for breach.130
This study, it is believed, has been sufficient to show
both the existence and the significance of promissory and non-
promissory conditions in the law of contracts. As a result
it is believed that it has been proved not only that they have
greater operative effect than other conditions on the relations
of contracting parties, but that the only rationale for the law
of past and substantial performance, time of performance, the
reasonable man standard in personal satisfaction cases and
for waiver is the law found in constructive promissory con-
ditions; and that more than any other conditions, promissory
and non-promissory conditions tend to rationalize the law in
some other difficult fields of contracts, like assignment, im-
possibility, and breach. For these reasons they are the most
significant of all conditions, and an understanding and use of
them are absolutely necessary to a complete mastery of the
law of conditions and contracts.
%so Down v. De Groot et al, 83 Cal. App. 155, 256 Pac. 438 (1927).
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